From 29 to 30 September 1938, an emergency meeting of the greatest European powers took place in Munich – without Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union, an ally of France and Czechoslovakia. They quickly agreed on Hitler`s terms. It was signed by the leaders of Germany, France, Britain and Italy. Militarily, the Sudetenland was of strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, as most of its border defense was located there to protect itself from a German attack. The agreement between the four powers was signed in the context of an undeclared german-Czechoslovak war of low intensity, which had begun on September 17, 1938. Meanwhile, after September 23, 1938, Poland moved its army units to its common border with Czechoslovakia. [2] Czechoslovakia yielded to diplomatic pressure from France and Britain and agreed on September 30 to cede territories to Germany on Munich terms. Fearing the possible loss of Zaolzie to Germany, Poland issued Zaolzie with an ultimatum with a majority of ethnic Poles that Germany had accepted in advance and that Czechoslovakia had accepted on 1 October. [3] The Czechoslovaks were dismayed by the colony of Munich.

They were not invited to the conference and felt betrayed by the British and French governments. Many Czechs and Slovaks refer to the Munich Agreement as the Munich diktat (Czech: Mnichovský diktát; Slovak: Mníchovský diktát). The term “betrayal of Munich” (Czech: Mnichovská zrada; Slovak: Mníchovská zrada) is also used because Czechoslovakia`s military alliance with France proved useless. This was also reflected in the fact that the French Government, in particular, had considered that Czechoslovakia would be considered responsible for a European war that would result if the Czechoslovak Republic defended itself by force against German incursions. [59] In 1938, the Soviet Union allied itself with France and Czechoslovakia. By September 1939, the Soviets were practically a comrade-in-arms of Nazi Germany, with Stalin fearing that a second Munich agreement with the Soviet Union would replace Czechoslovakia. Thus, the agreement indirectly contributed to the outbreak of war in 1939. [60] One aspect of the enormous turmoil of the past two weeks must affect anyone thinking about its history. In the three most powerful states of Central and Eastern Europe, people were not allowed to know what was being said and done outside. In Russia, there seems to have been very little news.

In Germany and Italy, news was deliberately falsified if it was not suppressed. The German people were not allowed to hear about President Roosevelt`s message. The Italian people were led to believe that Chamberlain agreed with Hitler and was only concerned with putting pressure on Benes. They were given a bad version of one of his speeches. The American historian William L. Shirer argued in his book The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960) that although Hitler did not bluff about his intention to invade, Czechoslovakia could have provided considerable resistance. Shirer believed that Britain and France had enough air defenses to avoid serious bombing of London and Paris and could have waged a quick and successful war against Germany. [66] He quotes Churchill as saying that the deal means that “Britain and France were in a much worse position than Hitler`s Germany.” [61] After Hitler personally inspected the Czech fortifications, he privately told Joseph Goebbels that “we had shed a lot of blood” and that he was glad there was no fighting. [67] During World War II, British Prime Minister Churchill, who rejected the agreement when it was signed, decided that the terms of the agreement would not be respected after the war and that Sudetenland should be returned to post-war Czechoslovakia. On August 5, 1942, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent the following note to Jan Masaryk: The slogan “About us, without us!” (Czech: O nás bez nás!) summarizes the feelings of the Czechoslovak people (now Slovakia and the Czech Republic) towards the agreement. [Citation needed] With the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, Czechoslovakia (as the state was renamed) lost its defensible border with Germany and its fortifications. Without it, its independence became more nominal than real.

Czechoslovakia also lost 70% of its steel industry, 70% of its electricity supply and 3.5 million citizens to Germany as a result of colonization. [61] Sudeten Germans celebrate what they considered their liberation. The impending war, it seems, had been averted. The agreement that allowed the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was signed on September 29, 1938. Citing Munich in foreign policy debates is also common in the 21st century. [107] During Secretary of State John Kerry`s negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal, a Texas Republican lawmaker called the negotiations “worse than Munich.” Kerry himself had invoked Munich in a speech in France, in which he advocated military action in Syria saying, “This is our Munich moment.” [108] Faced with high tensions between the Germans and the Czechoslovak government, Beneš secretly offered on September 15, 1938 to give 6,000 square kilometers (2,300 square miles) of Czechoslovakia to Germany in exchange for a German agreement to admit 1.5 to 2.0 million Sudeten Germans, whom Czechoslovakia would expel. Hitler did not respond. [13] London, FridayThe Munich Accords give Hitler (initially) everything he wants, except that they may not allow him to get it as quickly as he would have done under Godesberg`s unbridled ultimatum. He will begin tomorrow the invasion of Czechoslovakia, as he threatened in his speech of 12 September. It is free to occupy all regions where Sudeten Germans are in the majority, and to do so in rapid stages. The New York Times headline on the Munich Accords read: “Hitler gets less than his demands from the Sudetenland” and reported that a “cheerful crowd” cheered Daladier on his return to France, and that Chamberlain was “savagely acclaimed” on his return to Britain. [54] On September 28 at 10:00.m., four hours before the deadline and without accepting Hitler`s request to Czechoslovakia, the British ambassador to Italy, Lord Perth, summoned Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano to request an urgent meeting.

[37] Perth told Ciano that Chamberlain had asked him to include Mussolini in the negotiations and to urge Hitler to postpone the ultimatum. [37] At 11:00.m., Ciano met Mussolini and informed him of Chamberlain`s proposal; Mussolini agreed and responded by calling the Italian ambassador to Germany and telling him: “Go immediately to the Führer and tell him that whatever happens, I will be at his side, but that I ask for a delay of twenty-four hours before the start of hostilities. In the meantime, I`ll explore what can be done to fix the problem. [40] Hitler receives Mussolini`s message during talks with the French ambassador. Hitler told the ambassador: “My good friend, Benito Mussolini, asked me to postpone the marching orders of the German army by twenty-four hours, and I agreed. Of course, this was not a concession, as the date of the invasion was set for October 1, 1938. [41] In a conversation with Chamberlain, Lord Perth thanked Mussolini and asked that Mussolini be granted on September 29. In September, a four-power conference of Britain, France, Germany and Italy is expected to attend a four-power conference in Munich to resolve the Sudetenland problem before the 2:00 p.m. deadline. Mussolini agreed. [41] Hitler`s only demand was to ensure that Mussolini was included in the conference negotiations.

[41] As President of the United States Franklin D. . . . .