[3] “`Quad` reviews situation in Indo-Pacific region,” The Economic Times, November 4, 2019, economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/quad-reviews-situation-in-indo-pacific-region/articleshow/71906338.cms?from=mdr. Over the past two years, the four most capable states in the Indo-Pacific have increasingly agreed that as China continues to rise, the rules and norms of the US-led order in Asia are constantly being undermined and action is needed to strengthen and defend it. Although there are slight differences in emphasis, this sentiment was first reflected in Japan`s 2016 Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy[1], then in Australia`s 2016 Defence White Paper and the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, a series of recent diplomatic statements by the Indian Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister[2], and more clearly in the U.S. National Security Strategy of December 2017. MADAN: So the quad came together organically after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean region, where diplomats and military officials from these four countries coordinated to respond to the tsunami. From there, they had something called the tsunami base group. Later, in 2007, this turned into a meeting in May 2007 on the margins of a meeting in Asia, where the heads of the four countries met at the operational level in a quadripartite dialogue. This year, together with Singapore, they conducted a military exercise in the autumn of the same year. We called this Quad 1.0, but it went through pretty quickly for various reasons that I won`t discuss here. [99] “`The Quad` will meet in Singapore – can it offset China`s influence or foment `a new Cold War`?”, South China Morning Post, p. 15.

November 2018, www.scmp.com/print/news/asia/diplomacy/article/2173306/quad-will-meet-singapore-can-it-balance-chinas-influence-or-it. This analysis will argue that four-sided cooperation will continue to deepen despite the COVID-19 shock. While there are significant differences between the four countries in terms of threat perception, military capabilities, strategic priorities, ability to bear the costs of China`s potential retaliation, strategic culture, and constitutional imperatives, these differences limit but do not exclude quadrilateral cooperation. Given the forward-looking policies and mindsets of the United States, Japan and Australia, the pace and extent of quadripartite cooperation depends heavily on India`s will or, alternatively, its restraint. Together, the four states can cooperate more closely to establish norms, diplomatic embassies, practical economic measures to maintain a rules-based liberal order, and progressively establish interoperability and other forms of military cooperation, taking into account these constraints. In fact, there are arguments that there are more and more opportunities for India to view the quad as an improvement rather than a limitation of its strategic autonomy. [94] “Australia, US, India and Japan in talks to establish Belt and Road alternative: report,” Reuters, February 19, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-beltandroad-quad/australia-u-s-india-and-japan-in-talks-to-establish-belt-and-road-alternative-report-idUSKCN1G20WG. The U.S. national interest in promoting a military dimension of quad biking is simple. The US finds itself in direct competition with China, which it calls an authoritarian “revisionist” state that seeks to undermine and rewrite the rules of the US-led post-war order “while exploiting its advantages.” [78] In response, the 2019 U.S. Indo-Pacific Security Strategy Report makes it clear that in addition to strengthening and realigning its own forces with the Indo-Pacific region, Washington is seeking consensus and increased support for the U.S.

forward presence among existing allies and partners to defend the current order. [79] [87] Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (CSIS, March 16, 2020) www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue. The assessment of the prospects of the quad begins with the common interests that have brought the four countries together. These can be grouped into geostrategic interests and those concerning the nature of the international order. First, the four nations share a deep interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and preventing a regional state from becoming dominant. Such a State would have the capacity to establish a sphere of influence in the region, to construct rules that favour its own interests to the detriment of small States and to exclude or restrict geographical, economic and political access to countries outside the region. This reasoning applied to Imperial Japan before World War II and now also applies to an emerging China. As a non-resident state, U.S. military dominance in the Indo-Pacific has been perceived very differently, as much of its power projection capabilities in the Western Pacific depend on the continued approval of its allies along the first chain of islands. [6] The authors suggest that if a quadrupled trade deal were to become a reality, reducing trade costs would go a long way towards realizing the alliance`s economic potential. Mohammad M.

Rahman, Chanwahn Kim and Prabir De simulate free trade agreements in which different combinations of countries around the Indian and Pacific Oceans, such as the Quad, stop imposing import duties and quotas on each other`s goods. Each combination of countries is subject to two free trade scenarios. On the one hand, they only reduce import duties, on the other hand, they also reduce trade costs by 25%, for example by speeding up the movement of goods by reducing bureaucratic obstacles at borders and ports. .